Recent changes in the distribution of the social wage by Sefton, Tom
 i
Recent Changes in the Distribution of the Social Wage 
 
 
Tom Sefton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 
II. Approach................................................................................................................. 2 
III. Overall Distribution of Social Wage...................................................................... 8 
a) Current distribution....................................................................................... 8 
b) Changes over time ....................................................................................... 16 
c) Impact on inequality.................................................................................... 21 
IV. Analysis of Individual Services ........................................................................... 23 
a) Health............................................................................................................ 24 
b) Education...................................................................................................... 31 
c) Housing ........................................................................................................ 37 
d) Personal Social Services............................................................................... 42 
V. Summary ............................................................................................................... 46 
References ......................................................................................................................... 51 
Annex A: Details of Methodology for Allocating Benefits in Kind ............................. 52 
A1. Health care.................................................................................................... 52 
A2.  Education...................................................................................................... 53 
A3.  Housing ........................................................................................................ 55 
A4.  Personal Social Services............................................................................... 58 
Annex B: Survey Questions Used to Allocate Benefits in Kind.................................... 60 
Annex C: Breakdown of Expenditure by Service .......................................................... 62 
 
 
 
 
 
CASEpaper 62 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
November 2002  London School of Economics 
 Houghton Street 
 London WC2A 2AE 
 CASE enquiries – tel: 020 7955 6679 
 ii
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
 
The ESRC Research Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) was 
established in October 1997 with funding from the Economic and Social 
Research Council. It is located within the Suntory and Toyota 
International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD) 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and benefits 
from support from STICERD. It is directed by Howard Glennerster, John 
Hills, Kathleen Kiernan, Julian Le Grand, Anne Power and Carol 
Propper. 
 
Our Discussion Paper series is available free of charge. We also produce 
summaries of our research in CASEbriefs, and reports from various 
conferences and activities in CASEreports. To subscribe to the 
CASEpaper series, or for further information on the work of the Centre 
and our seminar series, please contact the Centre Administrator, Jane 
Dickson, on: 
 
Telephone:  UK+20 7955 6679 
Fax:   UK+20 7955 6951 
Email:  j.dickson@lse.ac.uk 
Web site:  http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/Case 
 
 
 
 
 Tom Sefton 
 
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, 
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including  notice, is given to the source. 
 
 iii
Editorial Note and Acknowledgments 
Tom Sefton is a Research Fellow at the ESRC Research Centre for 
Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) at the London School of Economics. 
He can be contacted at t.a.sefton@lse.ac.uk. The author is grateful to the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation for funding this research and to John Hills 
for providing advice and support throughout the project. He would also 
like to thank Fran Bennett, Jonathan Bradshaw, Caroline Lakin, David 
Piachaud and Holly Sutherland who, as members of a JRF Advisory 
Group, provided helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper, 
officials at various Government Departments for commenting on 
specific sections of the paper, and Abigail McKnight for editing this 
CASE Paper. 
 
 iv
Abstract 
This paper examines the distribution of the “social wage” benefits in 
kind from welfare services, including the National Health Service, state 
education, social housing, and personal social services. The current 
Government has put a strong emphasis on improving public services 
and has begun to translate this into higher spending. Although most 
measures of poverty ignore the social wage, its inclusion is potentially 
very significant in monitoring the impact of government policies on the 
poorest households. The paper produces estimates of the value of the 
social wage for 1996/7 and 2000/01, using data from several large-scale 
household surveys, and makes comparisons with estimates from 
previous work going back to 1979. The results show that people in 
poorer households receive a greater share of benefits in kind from 
welfare services than those in richer households and that this ‘pro-poor’ 
bias has been rising gradually over the long-term. Since 1996/7, 
spending on welfare services has grown faster than in the past and there 
has been a further incremental shift in favour of lower income groups 
across all the major services. These changes have reinforced the re-
distributional effects of tax and benefit policies over the same period, 
though they have not prevented inequality from rising. 
 
Keywords: social wage, benefits in kind, redistribution, inequality, 
welfare spending. 
JEL number: I30 
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I. Introduction 
Around a third of all government spending is on welfare services, such 
as the National Health Service, state education, social housing, and 
social care services. The value of these services can be thought of as an 
income in-kind – a “social wage” – that represents a substantial addition 
to people’s cash incomes, especially for those at the bottom of the 
income distribution.  
The current Government’s welfare reforms have put a strong 
emphasis on improved public services for all and the Government has, 
more recently, begun to translate this into higher spending. While public 
spending was tightly restrained for its first two years, spending plans 
for the rest of its first term incorporated substantial increases in 
spending, focused on health care and education. Their impact is of great 
policy relevance in view of the current Government’s concern with 
inequality and a more specific commitment to reducing child poverty (H 
M Treasury, 2001). How have the benefits of higher spending on certain 
services been spread and how far have any gains been offset by other 
changes in welfare policies, such as the abolition of maintenance grants 
for students and increases in local authority rents?  
Although most measures of poverty and inequality ignore the 
value of benefits in kind, their inclusion is potentially very significant in 
monitoring the impact of government policies on the poorest 
households. Analyses of the impact of fiscal reforms during Labour’s 
first term show that lower income groups have benefited most from 
changes to the tax/benefit system since May 1997 (Clark, Myck, and 
Smith, 2001; Piachaud and Sutherland, 2001). We look at whether these 
effects are magnified or offset by changes in the value of the social wage 
over the same period. 
The social wage is a measure of how much better off individuals 
are with the provision of publicly funded welfare services than they 
would be without these ‘in kind’ benefits (i.e. if they had to pay the full 
cost of these services). But, adding the social wage to people’s cash 
incomes will not produce a better measure of people’s standard of 
living. For example, the fact that an 85-year old is making intensive use 
of the NHS does not make him or her better off than a younger person 
who does not require as much health care. To measure the impact on 
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people’s living standards, you would also need to adjust for differences 
in needs between individuals, which is beyond the scope of this paper.   
Interest in the distribution of the social wage depends on the 
significance attached to the re-distributive role of welfare services, 
which is just one of a number of possible objectives. Much of what the 
welfare state does, for example, is to provide social insurance against 
adverse situations, such as unemployment or ill health (Hills, 1993). 
Furthermore, some commentators have argued that what matters is not 
how much people actually use a service, but the principle that everyone 
is entitled to use that service without discrimination, including on the 
basis of ability to pay (Powell, 1995). However, our starting point is that 
distributional issues are an important consideration for welfare services, 
though not the only one or, necessarily, the primary one. 
Previous research in this area has tended to focus on whether the 
delivery of a particular service is consistent with some notion of fairness 
or equality – usually measured in relation to needs (e.g. Le Grand, 1982; 
O’Connell and Propper, 1991). Whilst our analysis does not address in 
detail the relationship between needs and provision, it does provide a 
much more comprehensive picture as to how the benefits from welfare 
services vary according to people’s social, economic, and demographic 
characteristics, focusing on differences between income groups.  
Section II describes the methodology used to apportion the value 
of benefits in kind. Section III examines the overall distribution of the 
social wage in the most recent year, 2000/01, how this has changed over 
time, and the impact on income inequality. Section IV explores in more 
detail the distribution of benefits in kind for each of the major services 
and any significant changes since 1996/7. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Approach 
The Office of National Statistics (ONS) already produces annual 
estimates of benefits in kind for health, education, housing, and a few 
smaller items, such as welfare milk, as part of a much broader analysis 
of the distributional effects of taxes and public spending (Lakin, 2002). 
Whilst suitable for these purposes, their estimates of benefits in kind are 
only indicative. The apportionment of spending between households is 
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fairly crude – for example they allocate each individual a fixed amount 
for health care, based solely on their age and gender.  
Our approach seeks to improve on the ONS estimates, by allowing 
for the effects of income, tenure and other socio-economic variables on 
people’s use of welfare services. This shows that there are significant 
differences in the use of services by different income groups over and 
above the effects of age and gender – most of which will not be reflected 
in the official series. Analysis of previous estimates covering the period 
1979-93 shows that changes in the distribution of the social wage over 
time are also sensitive to the methodology used for apportioning 
benefits (Sefton, 1997).  
The work reported here updates, and improves on, our earlier 
research, using better data to generate more robust estimates. Our 
analysis is carried out for three different years – 1993/4, 1996/7, and 
2000/01. The first of these years corresponds to the final year of our 
previous study; this enables us to check the consistency of our results 
against previous work and gives us a historical series going back to 
1979. The focus of this paper, however, is on the two later years. 1996/7 
provides a baseline for this Labour Government. 2000/01 is the latest 
available dataset and corresponds broadly to the end of their first term.   
The base dataset for our analysis is the Family Resources Survey 
(FRS). The FRS contains information on a representative sample of over 
55,000 individuals in Great Britain1, including socio-demographic 
characteristics, household income, and the use of education, housing, 
and certain health care services. For 1996/7 only, the FRS Disability 
Follow-Up Survey provides additional data on the use of various social 
care services, including home care and day care. Information on the use 
of other NHS services is ‘imported’ from two other household surveys – 
the General Household Survey and the British Household Panel Survey 
(see Annex A for details of the methodology used). One of the 
advantages of having the FRS as our base dataset is that it is used to 
derive the Government’s official income measure for monitoring trends 
in inequality – Households Below Average Income – which we use to 
                                                
1  Population numbers are grossed up to UK levels, assuming that the FRS is 
representative of all households in the United Kingdom. This seems a 
reasonable assumption given that Northern Ireland accounts for only around 
2% of the total UK population.  
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rank households by income group. It is also substantially larger than 
other household surveys, so we can be much more confident that our 
estimates are capturing genuine variation in the use of services, as 
opposed to sampling errors.  
 For most services, benefits in kind are measured by apportioning 
total spending in proportion to individuals’ reported use of these 
services (see Annex B for a list of the survey questions used). For 
example, spending on in-patient care is distributed between those who 
reported an in-patient stay in an NHS hospital over the last year. 
Spending is not allocated on items that cannot easily be attributed to 
individuals or households, such as central administrative costs, or where 
there is no survey data on people’s use of those services. For health and 
education, we are able to allocate around four-fifths of total spending 
(see Table 1 below and Annex C for a more detailed breakdown of 
expenditure and data sources).  
Where fees are charged, as in the case of prescriptions for example, 
these are spread between users that are not exempt – again, in 
proportion to individuals’ use of these services. Where support is 
means-tested, as in the case of tuition fees, then the means-test is 
simulated, as far as possible, using survey data on people’s incomes and 
savings. Though revenue from welfare services is a relatively small 
proportion of gross spending, it has a disproportionate impact on the 
distribution of benefits in kind, because the costs are borne largely by 
better-off service users. 
For housing, however, net expenditure in any given year is a poor 
guide to the value of benefits in kind. What we attempt to measure 
instead is the difference between the rents charged by local authorities 
before deducting housing benefit2 and the ‘economic rent’ they would 
need to charge in order to cover their costs in full. Economic rents are 
estimated using information on the rents paid for similar properties in 
the private rented sector (see Annex A). Former Right To Buy 
participants are also allocated a benefit in kind to reflect the subsidy 
they receive in the form of large discounts on the purchase price of their 
                                                
2  Housing Benefit is already counted in measures of household income, so we 
do not want to include it in our measure of benefits in kind. What we 
estimate, therefore, is the additional subsidy to social sector tenants due to the 
sub-market rents charged by local authorities and housing associations. 
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home. This ensures that comparisons over time are not distorted by the 
shift from one form of subsidy (i.e. subsidised social housing) to another 
(i.e. subsidised owner-occupation). 
 
Table 1: Total Value of Benefits in Kind Allocated by Service 
(£billion, 2000/01 prices) 1996/97 2000/01 
Health1: 
Total expenditure: 
% allocated: 
 
44.9 
86% 
 
54.1 
84% 
Education1: 
Total expenditure: 
% allocated: 
 
40.3 
78% 
 
44.2 
78% 
Housing2: 
Total economic subsidy: 
% allocated: 
 
16.1 
100% 
 
15.8 
100% 
Personal Social Services1,3: 
Total expenditure: 
% allocated: 
 
13.1 
41% 
 
14.7 
- 
 
Notes: 
1. Total UK expenditure from Department of Health Annual Reports (for health) and H 
M Treasury’s Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (for education and PSS). See 
Annex C for breakdown of spending by service and details of which items are 
allocated. 
2. Total value of imputed economic subsidies for social sector tenants and Right To Buy 
purchasers (excluding Housing Benefit, which is already included in measures of 
household income).  
3. Includes Income Support expenditure on people living in residential care/ nursing 
homes. 
 
Students living in halls of residence and older people in residential 
homes are a problem because they are omitted from household surveys. 
Benefits in kind from higher education are instead allocated to the 
students’ parents (except for mature students), who can be identified in 
the FRS dataset. The justification for this is that in the absence of 
government subsidies, it is parents who would bear some, perhaps 
most, of the additional cost of educating their children. This is consistent 
with the principles that underlie the funding of higher education; 
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support towards tuition fees, for example, is based on parental incomes, 
not students’ own incomes.  
Benefits in kind from residential care are allocated to the 
household population using an insurance-based approach. The logic is 
that the government is effectively providing (partial) insurance against 
the risk of being admitted into residential care. The actuarial value of 
this insurance is equal to the probability that someone will require 
residential care (which depends on their age and other factors) 
multiplied by the amount of financial support they would receive if they 
were admitted into residential care (which is means-tested).   
Although this approach represents a significant improvement on 
previous work, the apportionment of benefits is still crude in certain 
respects. For example, no allowance is made for variations in the unit 
costs of providing services by region or locality. Quite a lot of this 
variation would be cancelled out when aggregating across income 
groups. Furthermore, some of this variation is explained by differences 
in pay levels, which may not reflect genuine differences in the quality of 
services being provided. (What we are attempting to measure is the 
value of services to recipients, not the amount spent on them per se.) 
Some policies, however, are designed to favour poorer areas - for 
example, funding formulae that allocate more money to schools or 
health authorities in disadvantaged areas – and their impact will not be 
picked up in our analysis. Nor will the impact of the myriad of new 
initiatives that are targeted at poorer areas, such as Sure Start or Health 
Action Zones, because the beneficiaries of these schemes are not 
identified in our datasets. The amounts of money are small, though, 
relative to mainstream funding of health and education.  Of course, 
equivalent or even higher spending, in poorer areas does not mean that 
service outputs or outcomes will be the same, because of the additional 
costs and challenges often involved in providing services in more 
deprived areas. 
In analysing our results, we focus on the value of benefits in kind 
going to lower income groups relative to higher income groups. Services 
are described as ‘pro-poor’ if the amounts received are, on average, 
greater for individuals in lower income groups than for those in higher 
income groups – and ‘pro-rich’ if the converse is true. Differences in the 
demographic composition of households have a significant influence on 
the distribution of benefits in kind, because many services are targeted 
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at, or used more intensively by, particular age and gender groups. But, if 
education spending on lower income groups is greater simply because 
there are more children in lower income groups, is it still reasonable to 
describe the distribution as pro-poor? We think it is, although we also 
think it is useful to distinguish the impact of demographic factors from 
other factors that may contribute to a ‘pro-poor’ or ‘pro-rich’ bias.  
To do this, we estimate what the distribution would look like if all 
individuals were allocated the average amount for other people in the 
same age and gender group. The difference between this age/gender 
based distribution and the estimated distribution of benefits in kind can 
be attributed to non-demographic factors. This is what we refer to as the 
“income effect” – that part of the distribution that is specifically related 
to people’s position in the income distribution. Even after adjustments 
have been made for demographic factors, we might still expect an 
equitable distribution to be pro-poor, because people’s needs are also 
affected by non-demographic factors. For example, surveys of self-
reported morbidity suggest that, other things being equal, individuals in 
lower income groups have higher rates of ill-health.  
The discussion so far implies that a pro-poor distribution of the 
social wage is desirable, because we have assumed that redistribution is 
one of the objectives of welfare services. However, there are arguments 
that suggest that a more pro-poor distribution is not always a good 
thing. Universal services, it can be argued, create a kind of “social 
citizenship” which is beneficial for society. Targeted services, though 
they are more pro-poor, can lead to the residualisation of the welfare 
state. Better off households may opt out of, or be ineligible for, publicly-
funded services, whilst poorer households may have little choice but to 
continue using these services, which over time may command less 
public support, attract less funding, and more stigma. Thus, we need to 
be careful in how we interpret the results of this analysis and the 
assumptions we make about desirability or otherwise of any particular 
distribution. 
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III. Overall Distribution of Social Wage 
a) Current distribution 
Figure 1 shows the overall distribution of benefits in kind, based on the 
methodology described in the previous section and Annex A (see Table 
2 for the full set of estimates for 1996/7 and 2000/1). Health care and 
education are the major components of the social wage, although 
benefits in kind from social housing have a very significant 
distributional impact, because they are more closely targeted at poorer 
income groups and because our methodology generates much larger 
estimates than those published by the Office of National Statistics (see 
below). We were unable to produce estimates for personal social services 
(PSS) for 2000/01, so we use estimates for 1996/7 (in 2000/01 prices) in 
our initial analysis, in order to give an indication of their impact on the 
overall shape of the distribution. 
As in previous analyses, the distribution is pro-poor in that lower 
income groups receive a greater absolute value of benefits in kind than 
higher income groups. There is also a small hump in the distribution. On 
average, individuals in the bottom two groups receive around twice the 
value of benefits in kind received by the top income group, 50% more 
than the fourth quintile, and 25% more than the middle quintile. The 
shape of this distribution is determined by differences in the use of 
welfare services between individuals in different income groups. These 
differences are evident across most of the services we looked at, and, 
with one or two exceptions, they are statistically significant and favour 
lower income groups. Variations in the use of individual services are 
discussed in more detail in Section IV. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Social Wage, 2000/01  
(£s per person, 2000/01 prices) 
 
 The shape of the distribution is partly explained by demographic 
factors, in particular the fact that lower income groups contain a high 
proportion of children and pensioners, who are the most intensive users 
of welfare services. However, demographic factors are only partly 
responsible for the pro-poor distribution of benefits in kind or for the 
hump (see Table 3). The “income effect” – once the effect of 
demographic factors has been netted off - is positive for the bottom two 
quintiles and negative for the top two quintiles – and is at least as large 
as the “demographic effect”. Each percentage point is worth around £80 
per year per person, so the “income effect” is substantive – the 7.2 
percentage point differential between the bottom and top quintile 
groups in 2000/01 is worth an extra £600 per person. Changes in the pro-
poor bias between 1996/7 and 2000/1 are discussed later in this section.  
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Table 2: Distribution of Benefits in Kind, 1996/97-2000/01 
(£ per person, 2000/01 prices, rounded to nearest £10) 
 1996/97 2000/01 Change 
(1996/7-2000/01) 
Totals (excl. PSS)    
Bottom 1840 2100 +260 
2 1950 2170 +220 
3 1610 1730 +120 
4 1270 1400 +130 
Top   960 1010 +50 
Average 
 
1530 1680 +150 
Health    
Bottom 760 930 +170 
2 900 1090 +190 
3 740 840 +100 
4 580 640 +60 
Top 430 510 +80 
Average 
 
680 800 +120 
Education    
Bottom 680 750 +70 
2 560 660 +100 
3 600 610 +10 
4 500 560 +60 
Top 450 430 -20 
Average 
 
560 600 +40 
Housing    
Bottom 400 420 +20 
2 490 420 -70 
3 270 280 +10 
4 190 200 +10 
Top 80 70 -10 
Average 
 
290 280 -10 
Personal Social Services    
Bottom 90 - - 
2 180 - - 
3 120 - - 
4 70 - - 
Top 20 - - 
Average 100 - - 
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Table 3: Changing Distribution of Social Wage, 1996/7-2000/01 
(excluding personal social services) 
 Actual share 
received 
(1) 
Share received if 
distribution were 
based solely on age 
and gender 
(2) 
“Demographic 
effect” 
(2) less 20% 
 
“Income 
effect” 
(1) – (2) 
 
2000/01     
Bottom 24.9% 22.5% +2.5% +2.4% 
2 25.8% 22.1% +2.1% +3.7% 
3 20.6% 20.2% +0.2% +0.4% 
4 16.7% 18.4% -1.6% -1.7% 
Top 
 
12.0% 16.8% -3.2% -4.8% 
1996/97     
Bottom 24.1% 22.5% +2.5% +1.6% 
2 25.6% 21.9% +1.9% +3.7% 
3 21.1% 20.3% +0.3% +0.7% 
4 16.6% 18.4% -1.6% -1.9% 
Top 
 
12.6% 16.8% -3.2% -4.1% 
Change: 1996/97-2000/01 
Bottom +0.9% 0.0%  +0.8% 
2 +0.1% +0.2%    0.0% 
3 -0.5% -0.1%  -0.3% 
4 -0.0% 0.0%  +0.2% 
Top -0.5% 0.0%  -0.7% 
 
Figures 2a-c presents our estimates alongside those published by 
the Office of National Statistics. This is done on a consistent basis, using 
households, rather than individuals, as the unit of analysis. We compare 
the shares received by different income groups, because we are mainly 
interested in the shape of the distribution, rather than the absolute 
amounts.  
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Figure 2: Comparison with ONS Estimates, 2000/01 
(Share of benefits in kind received by each income group) 
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The overall distribution is broadly comparable, although the ONS 
allocate a larger share of benefits in kind to the top and bottom quintile 
groups and smaller shares to the second and third quintile groups (see 
Figure 2a). These differences represent the net effect of taking into 
account more fully the impact of people’s incomes and other socio-
economic characteristics on their use of welfare services, as well as other 
methodological differences (see below). This comparison hides larger 
differences for individual services (see Figures 2b and 2c). In general, 
their distribution of health care is less pro-poor, which is what we would 
expect because they only take into account differences in spending that 
are related to age and gender. On the other hand, their distribution of 
education is more pro-poor, largely because they allocate spending on 
higher education to students, whereas we allocate them to their parents 
(who tend to be much higher up the income distribution). Finally, their 
estimates of housing benefits in kind are much smaller than ours – only 
£40 per household, on average, compared to £650 per household - 
because we use a very different approach to measuring the value of 
social housing. Housing has very little impact on their estimates, but 
significantly increases the pro-poor bias of our distribution. 
Figures 3-5 show how our estimates of benefits in kind vary with 
other important socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, family 
type, and tenure. These are interesting in themselves, but also help 
towards understanding the distribution between income groups.  
The distribution by age is U-shaped (see Figure 3). Children 
receive the majority of benefits from education, whilst older people 
benefit most from health care and personal social services. There are also 
some differences by gender.  Young women use more health care, which 
is mostly linked to childbirth, whilst older women receive more social 
care, because they are more likely to be living alone. Middle-aged men 
receive more only because, as heads of household, they are allocated 
benefits in kind from higher education on behalf of their children. 
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Figure 3: Distribution by Age Group, 2000/01 
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 Single pensioners and single parent families receive the greatest 
benefits in kind (see Figure 4). Single pensioners do better than 
pensioner couples, because they are older and poorer, on average, and 
are more likely to be in social housing. Single parents do well, because 
they have the highest ratio of children and because they, too, are more 
likely to be poor and in social housing. Couples without children and 
other adult-only households do least well for the opposite reasons. 
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Figure 4: Distribution by Household Type, 2000/01 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Pensioner
single
Pensioner
couple
Single, no
child
Couple, no
children
Single with
children
Couple with
children
3+ adults,
no children
3+ adults
with
children
£s
 
pe
r 
pe
rs
o
n PSS
Housing
Education
Health
 
Not surprisingly, social sector tenants receive the highest social 
wage, partly because they receive most of the housing benefits in kind, 
but also because they include a disproportionate number of children and 
very old people (see Figure 5). Owner-occupiers receive some housing 
benefits in kind through the Right To Buy scheme. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution by Tenure, 2000/01 
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b) Changes over time 
Changes in the distribution of the social wage are examined both over 
the long-term – using previous estimates going back to 1979 – and over 
the more recent period covering this Labour Government’s first term in 
office. To ensure greater consistency over the longer ‘historical’ series, 
we re-computed the value of benefits in kind for recent years using a 
close approximation to the methodology used in our previous research, 
including a different approach to estimating the value of housing 
benefits in kind. We also exclude personal social services, because we do 
not have estimates for 2000/1. For 1993/4, we were able to make a direct 
comparison with our previous estimates and the match is very good. 
(We would not expect a perfect match, in any case, because we are using 
a different dataset3.) The results for the period 1979-2000/01 are shown in 
Figure 6 (in 2000/01 prices).  
There has been a substantial growth in the value of the social wage 
in real terms – an increase of 48%, on average, across the whole 
population. Lower income groups have benefited more than higher 
income groups – a rise of more than 60% for the bottom two quintile 
groups, but only 36% for the fourth quintile and just over 20% for the 
top quintile. The dispersion over time between lower and higher income 
groups is shown more clearly in Figure 7.  
 
                                                
3  The base dataset for the earlier work (Sefton, 1997) was the Family 
Expenditure Survey, as opposed to the Family Resources Survey. 
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Figure 6: Historical Changes in Distribution of Social Wage1 
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Note:  
Figures for 1979, 1987, and 1993 are from Table 2.2 of Sefton (1997). These are converted to 
2000/01 prices, using the GDP deflator (at market prices). 
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Figure 7: Increase in Social Wage by Quintile Group: 1979-2000/01 
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Figure 8 shows how the share of the social wage going to different 
income groups has changed over this period, highlighting the 
incremental shift in favour of lower income groups. This increase in the 
overall ‘pro-poor’ bias cannot be accounted for by demographic factors. 
Whilst children have become more concentrated in the bottom half of 
the income distribution, there are now more pensioners in higher 
income groups. Other things being equal, the net effect of these 
demographic changes would have been to increase the share of the 
social wage going to higher income groups (i.e. the opposite of what has 
happened). Other possible explanations are discussed later in this paper 
and summarised in Section V. 
 
1993 1996/7 2000/11979 1987 
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Figure 8: Share of Social Wage by Income Group: 1979-2000/01 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Bottom 2 3 4 Top
Quintile group of individuals
Sh
ar
e 
o
f b
en
ef
its
 
in
 
ki
n
d 
re
ce
iv
ed
 b
y 
in
co
m
e 
gr
o
u
p
1979
1987
1993
1996/7
2000/1
 
A more detailed analysis is possible over the period since 1996/7, 
using data only available in recent surveys and a different approach to 
estimating housing benefits in kind. As in previous periods, there is an 
increase in the value of the social wage in real terms, which is greatest 
for lower income groups. This leads to a small, but significant, increase 
in the pro-poor bias: between 1996/7 and 2000/1, the share of the social 
wage received by the bottom income group rose by 0.8 percentage 
points and the share of the top income group fell by 0.7 percentage 
points – none of which was due to demographic factors (see Table 3).  
To help put these changes into context, it is useful to make a 
comparison with changes in the tax/benefit system over the same period 
– the other major instrument for redistribution. We use estimates 
produced by the Institute for Fiscal Studies as part of their briefing notes 
for the last election (Clark, Myck, and Smith, 2001). These show the net 
effect of major changes in the tax/benefit system that directly affected 
individuals or households, including changes in income tax, VAT, excise 
duties, tax credits, and benefits, but excluding changes in business 
taxation. Changes are calculated as a percentage of the mean disposable 
income of households in each income group. Their analysis covers the 
period from 1997/8 to June 2001, which is slightly shorter than the period 
covered by our analysis of the social wage, although most of the increase 
in spending on public services under this Government occurred after 
1997/8.  Rather than comparing the situation of income groups at 
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different points in time, they simulate the impact of tax/benefit changes 
for a static population – as it was in 1997/8 – in order to isolate the effect 
of policy change from other changes in the socio-economic 
circumstances of households. Thus, our estimates are not directly 
comparable, but the results are indicative. 
Changes in the tax/benefit system and the social wage were both 
progressive over this period: households in lower income groups 
benefited more in percentage terms than households in higher income 
groups (see Figure 9). The impact of changes in the social wage is 
smaller and slightly less progressive than changes in taxes and benefits, 
but the overall effect is significant and reinforces fiscal reforms over the 
same period.  
 
Figure 9: Distributional impact of major fiscal reforms 
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c) Impact on inequality 
A measure of final income can be calculated by adding the value of 
benefits in kind (for whole households) to the official Household Below 
Average Income (HBAI) measure of disposable income. (This measure of 
“final” income is different from the ONS’s definition of final income in 
that we do not deduct indirect taxes.) On average, the social wage makes 
up around a sixth of households’ final incomes. However, it is a much 
greater proportion of final incomes for households lower down the 
income distribution – around 40% for those in the bottom quintile, 
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compared to 20% for the middle quintile, and just 5% for those in the top 
quintile.  
Even if the value of the social wage were the same, on average, for 
all income groups, it would still have an equalising impact on final 
incomes. (To have no effect at all, benefits in kind would have to be as 
unequally distributed as cash incomes.) One way to assess the equalising 
impact of the social wage is to look at the share of income received by 
different income groups before and after the addition of the social wage. 
The bottom three quintile groups receive a greater share of final incomes 
than of cash incomes and vice-versa for the top two quintile groups (see 
Table 4).  
Between 1979-1993, there is evidence that the ‘equalising impact’ 
of the social wage increased. Over that period, it is estimated that 
changes in the distribution of the social wage reduced the growth in 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, by around a fifth (Sefton, 
1997). Between 1996/7-2000/01, changes in the distribution of final 
incomes have been virtually the same as changes in the distribution of 
cash incomes. The social wage reduces inequality in both years by 
around the same amount; hence, the equalising impact of the social 
wage has remained broadly constant over this more recent period. On 
the one hand, the social wage has become more pro-poor since 1996/7, 
which, other things being equal, would have increased the equalising 
impact of the social wage. On the other hand, the average value of 
households’ social wage has grown more slowly than their cash 
incomes4 - 8% in real terms, compared to 12%. These two factors more or 
less cancelled each other out over this period.  
 
                                                
4  Whilst health care spending rose by around 20% in real terms, the value of 
housing benefits in kind has fallen slightly in real terms. Another reason the 
average social wage per household did not grow faster is that the average size 
of households fell over this period, so there were fewer potential service users 
in each household in 2000/1 than in 1996/7. 
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Table 4: Equalising Impact of Social Wage, 1996/97-2000/01 
(Shares received by each income group) 
 1996/7 2000/01 Change: 
Cash incomes1     
Bottom 7.6% 7.1% -0.5% 
2 11.3% 11.4% +0.1% 
3 17.0% 16.7% -0.3% 
4 23.6% 22.7% -0.9% 
Top 
 
40.6% 42.1% +1.5% 
Final incomes    
Bottom 10.4% 9.9% -0.5% 
2 13.4% 13.7% +0.3% 
3 17.9% 17.5% -0.4% 
4 22.5% 21.8% -0.7% 
Top 
 
35.8% 37.1% +1.3% 
Equalising impact of social wage2  
Bottom 2.8% 2.8% 0.0% 
2 2.1% 2.3% -0.2% 
3 0.9% 0.8% +0.1% 
4 -1.1% -0.9% -0.2% 
Top -4.8% -5.0% +0.2% 
 
Notes: 
1. HBAI income measure, before housing costs. 
2. Difference between the share of final incomes received and the share of cash incomes 
received. Positive numbers for lower income groups (and negative numbers for 
higher income groups) indicate that the social wage is having an equalising impact. 
The final column shows how this equalising impact has changed over this period. 
 
IV. Analysis of Individual Services 
This section examines the distribution of benefits in kind for individual 
services, disaggregating the results further, and seeking to explain the 
current distribution and any changes since 1996/7. This is aimed at 
readers with a particular interest in one or more of the major services. 
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The final section summarises the key findings for those who are looking 
for a broader overview. 
 
a) Health  
Health care is the largest component of the social wage. In 2000/01, the 
UK spent an average of £950 per person on all health care services, of 
which we allocate around £800. Since 1996/7, expenditure has risen by 
around 20% in real terms.   
 
UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRIBUTION 
Table 5 shows the overall distribution of health care benefits in kind for 
the whole population and by age group. The overall distribution of 
health care benefits in kind is pro-poor, but with a clear hump in the 
distribution. Those in the second quintile group receive more than those 
in the bottom income group, but both groups receive substantially more 
than higher income groups. This pro-poor bias appears consistently 
across different health care services (see Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10: Distribution of Benefits for Major Health Care Services  
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Table 5: Distribution of Health Care Benefits in Kind, 1996/7-2000/011 
(£ per person, 2000/01 prices, rounded to nearest £10) 
 1996/7 2000/01 Change: 
(1996/7-2000/1) 
All persons    
Bottom 760 930 +170 
2 900 1090 +190 
3 740 840 +100 
4 580 640 +60 
Top 430 510 +80 
Average 680 800 +120 
Pensioners    
Bottom 1560 1870 +310 
2 1790 2160 +370 
3 1910 2100 +190 
4 1810 1970 +160 
Top 1090 1510 +420 
Average 
 
1690 1990 +300 
Working age adults    
Bottom 670 810 +140 
2 680 850 +170 
3 560 640 +80 
4 440 500 +60 
Top 370 420 +50 
Average 
 
520 620 +100 
Children    
Bottom 380 480 +100 
2 480 600 +120 
3 430 500 +70 
4 450 460 +10 
Top 460 500 +40 
Average 430 510 +80 
 
Variations in the use of health care services by income group are 
shown in more detail in Table 6. The confidence intervals for our 
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estimates are relatively narrow and, therefore, differences between the 
bottom quintile and other income groups are statistically significant in 
most cases. They always favour the bottom income group over the top 
income group, although individuals in the second quintile group are 
often more likely to use these services – hence the hump-shaped 
distribution of health care benefits in kind. We also explored differences 
in the use of services among those with a long-standing and limiting 
illness (i.e. ill and poor versus ill and rich). This is discussed a little later 
on. 
 
Table 6: Use of Health Care Services by Income Group, 2000/01 
Income group (quintile groups of individuals)% of individuals using each service and 
whether significantly different to bottom 
quintile  Bottom 2 3 4 Top 
NHS in-patient stay1 (in last year) 
- All persons 
- Long-term ill3 
 
 
8% 
20% 
 
 10%** 
 22%* 
 
 7% 
19% 
 
  4%** 
12%** 
 
  4%** 
11%** 
NHS out-patient visit1 (in last 3 mths) 
- All persons 
- Long-term ill 
 
 
13% 
27% 
 
18%** 
34%** 
 
15%* 
 34%** 
 
 14% 
  32%* 
 
 12%* 
 32%* 
GP consultation1 (in last 2 wks) 
- All persons 
- Long-term ill 
 
 
17% 
32% 
 
 18%* 
33% 
 
15%** 
29% 
 
 
13%** 
24%** 
 
12%** 
24%** 
Prescription received2 (in last 4 wks) 
- All persons 
- Long-term ill 
 
33% 
66% 
 
36%** 
70%** 
 
 31%** 
 69%* 
 
 26%** 
66% 
 
24%** 
58%** 
 
Notes: 
**  significantly different to bottom quintile at 1% level, * significantly different at 10% 
level. 
1. Based on General Household Survey (GHS). 
2. Based on Family Resources Survey (FHS). 
3. Those who report having a long-standing and limiting illness in response to 
standardised questions used in the FHS, GHS and other large-scale household 
surveys. 
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Part of the overall pro-poor bias can be explained by differences in 
the demographic composition of income groups. Lower income groups 
contain a higher proportion of older people, who are the most intensive 
users of health care services. The lightly shaded columns in Figure 11 
shows how the distribution would look if spending were allocated on 
the basis of age and gender alone (i.e. if everyone received the average 
amount for their age/gender group). The difference between this and the 
actual distribution shows the impact of income and other socio-
economic characteristics on people’s use of NHS services. There is a 
clear and substantial pro-poor bias in the distribution over and above 
the impact of demographic factors; this is what we referred to earlier as 
the “income effect”. 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of Health Benefits in Kind, 2000/01  
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The distribution of benefits varies markedly between age groups 
(see Table 5). Among pensioners, the distribution is hump-shaped with 
those in middle income groups making the greatest use of health care 
services. Among the working age population, there is a fairly strong pro-
poor gradient and among children, the distribution is flat. 
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Differential use of private health care services only explains a 
small part of these differences between income groups and this effect is 
concentrated at the top end of the income distribution. Differences in 
self-reported morbidity are much more important. People with long-
standing and limiting illness make up around a fifth of the total 
population, but account for over half of total health care expenditure. 
Their position in the income distribution, therefore, has a major impact 
on the pattern of health care spending.  
Within the pensioner population, those with a long-standing 
limiting illness are concentrated in middle income groups, whilst among 
the working age population and children they are concentrated in lower 
income groups - though in the case of children, they are too few in 
number to have a significant impact on the distribution (see Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Self-reported morbidity by Income Group, 2000/1 
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This helps to explain the overall shape of the distribution, but not 
the extent of the pro-poor bias or the size of the hump. Focusing only on 
those with a long-standing and limiting illness, use of health care 
services is often highest for those in the second and third quintiles and 
lowest for those in the top quintile group (see Table 6). One possible 
explanation is that people in middle income groups may have more 
severe conditions that require more treatment. In addition, those in the 
bottom quintile group may be less able or willing to access health care 
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services (for a given level of need), which might explain the hump in the 
distribution. The same pattern is evident in the distribution of benefits in 
kind for non-residential social care services.   
 
EXPLAINING CHANGES 
All income groups have benefited from increased public expenditure on 
health care, but the share going to lower income groups has risen over 
this period, leading to an increase in the pro-poor bias (see Table 7). This 
cannot be accounted for by demographic effects, which were relatively 
small and worked more in favour of higher income groups. Some of 
these changes may be accounted for by changes in patterns of morbidity 
over this period. Reported incidence of long-standing limiting illness 
rose by 2 percentage points, on average, between 1996/7 and 2000/01, but 
by 6 percentage points for those in the bottom quintile group.  
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Table 7: Changing Distribution of Health Care Benefits in Kind, 
1996/7-2000/01 
 Actual share 
received 
(1) 
Share received if 
distribution were based 
solely on age and gender 
(2) 
Income effect 
(1) – (2) 
  
2000/01    
Bottom 23.2% 21.8% +1.4% 
2 27.2% 22.9% +4.3% 
3 21.0% 20.0% +1.0% 
4 16.0% 18.1% -2.1% 
Top 
 
12.6% 17.2% -4.6% 
1996/97    
Bottom 22.2% 21.7% +0.5% 
2 26.5% 23.5% +3.0% 
3 21.8% 20.0% +1.7% 
4 16.9% 17.9% -1.0% 
Top 
 
12.7% 16.9% -4.2% 
Change: 1996/97-2000/01 
Bottom +1.0% +0.1% +0.9% 
2 +0.7% -0.6% +1.3% 
3 -0.8% 0.0% -0.7% 
4 -0.9% +0.2% -1.1% 
Top -0.1% +0.3% -0.4% 
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b) Education 
Education is the second largest component of the social wage. In 
2000/01, the UK spent around £800 per person on schools, further, and 
higher education. We allocate around 80% of this. Since 1996/7, 
expenditure on education has risen by around 10% in real terms.   
 
UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRIBUTION 
Table 8 shows the overall distribution of education benefits in kind and 
a breakdown by level of education. The distribution of benefits in kind 
from education is consistently pro-poor. Distribution is dominated by 
spending on schools, which accounts for over half of all spending on 
education and is strongly pro-poor. Spending on further education and 
post-compulsory schooling is also pro-poor, though less so. Spending on 
higher education is pro-rich if the benefits are allocated to their parents, 
although this result is very sensitive to assumptions about the impact of 
supporting dependent students on their parents’ standard of living (see 
below). 
The demographic composition of income groups explains a large 
part of the pro-poor bias in spending. The bottom quintile group 
contains around twice as many children as the top quintile, which 
explains most of the variation in school attendance between income 
groups (see Table 9). Among children aged 4-15, attendance at state 
schools is close to 100% for all income groups, except for top income 
group who are much more likely to educate their children privately.  
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Table 8: Distribution of Education Benefits in Kind, 1996/7-2000/01 
(£ per person, 2000/01 prices Rounded to nearest £10) 
 1996/7 2000/01 Change: 
(1996/7-2000/1) 
Total    
Bottom 680 750 +70 
2 560 660 +100 
3 600 610 +10 
4 500 560 +60 
Top 450 430 -20 
Average 
 
560 600 +40 
Schools (under 16)    
Bottom 500 540 +40 
2 410 490 +80 
3 390 420 +30 
4 270 320 +50 
Top 170 210 +40 
Average 
 
350 400 +50 
Post-compulsory schooling and FE 
Bottom 90 100 +10 
2 70 90 -20 
3 80 80 0 
4 80 90 -10 
Top 50 60 +10 
Average 
 
70 80 +10 
Higher education    
Bottom 80 100 +20 
2 80 80 0 
3 120 100 -20 
4 140 140 0 
Top 230 170 -50 
Average 130 120 -10 
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Table 9: Use of Education Services by Income Group, 2000/01 
Income group (quintile groups of individuals) % of individuals using each service and 
whether significantly different from use by 
bottom quintile  
Bottom 2 3 3 Top 
State school (primary/secondary/special)1 
- All persons 
- Children aged 4-15 
 
 
19% 
95% 
 
17%** 
94% 
 
 5%** 
93%* 
 
11%** 
92%** 
 
  8%** 
77%** 
Post-16 state education or further 
education (full-time students only)1  
- All persons 
- Young people aged 16-17 
 
 
 
2.0% 
59% 
 
 
2.0% 
68%** 
 
 
1.8% 
  66%* 
 
 
 1.9% 
70%** 
 
 
1.3%** 
 70%** 
Higher education1  
- All persons 
- All university-age children2 
- University-age children living at 
home3 
 
2.0% 
    24% 
42% 
 
1.5%**
   20%*
 34%** 
 
 2.1% 
  22% 
  31%** 
 
 3.0%** 
  27%* 
39% 
 
3.4%** 
 36%** 
 50%** 
 
Notes: 
**  significantly different to bottom quintile at 1% level, * significantly different at 10% 
level  
1. Based on Family Resources Survey. 
2. All young people aged 18-24. 
3. Only those 18-24 year olds who are living with one or both parents. 
 
The distribution of further education and post-compulsory 
schooling is fairly flat, except for a dip at the top of the income 
distribution. The bottom quintile group contains more young people 
than other income groups, but they are less likely to stay on in full-time 
education. Young people from the top quintile group are the most likely 
to stay on, but there are fewer of them and they are also more likely to 
be in private schools and less likely to be in special education, which is 
roughly four times more expensive than mainstream secondary or 
further education.  
Higher education is one of the few public services that appears to 
favour the richest households, if, as in this analysis, the benefits to 
dependent students are allocated to the parental household. The 
majority of funding for higher education is in the form of grants to 
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universities, the benefits of which we assume are spread evenly between 
students from all backgrounds. Households in the top quintile group are 
more likely to have children at university, so they benefit 
disproportionately from this source of funding. This pro-rich bias is 
partly offset by the student support system (student loans and 
contributions towards tuition fees), which are both means-tested, at least 
in part (on the basis of parental income in the case of dependent 
students).  
This picture changes substantially if differences in the 
demographic composition of income groups are taken into account. 
Parents with university-age children are found disproportionately in 
higher income groups and this appears to explain much of the pro-rich 
bias in the distribution (see Table 9). The implication is that 
demographic factors, rather than differential access to higher education, 
are at least partly responsible for the pro-rich bias (although this does 
not alter the fact that it is the richest households that are benefiting most 
from public expenditure on higher education).  
Arguably, however, some of these households are not as well off 
as their position in the income distribution implies, because the income 
measure we are using to rank households does not allow for the cost of 
supporting children who are studying away from home. If we are going 
to allocate to parents the value of government subsidies to their 
children, then there is a good case for adjusting their incomes to reflect 
the additional costs to their parents of supporting these children – we do 
this by deducting the estimated maintenance costs for each full-time 
student living away from home5. (The costs of supporting students 
living at home are already taken into account in the equivalence scale.) 
When households are re-ranked using this adjusted income measure, the 
distribution of benefits in kind from higher education becomes much 
more pro-poor (see Figure 13), showing how sensitive the results can be 
to this kind of adjustment.      
 
                                                
5  As a proxy for the maintenance costs of a full-time student, we deduct the 
maximum student loan for students living away from home.   
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Figure 13: Higher Education Benefits in Kind - Sensitivity Analysis 
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EXPLAINING CHANGES 
The distribution of benefits in kind from schools appears to be very 
stable over time. We assume that total expenditure in each sector is 
evenly distributed between all pupils, so the impact of any re-allocation 
of resources within these sectors, for example between primary or 
secondary schools in richer and poorer areas, would not be captured in 
this analysis.  
The distribution of spending on post-compulsory schooling and 
further education, has also been relatively stable, although there has 
been a small pro-poor shift. Participation rates have risen for all income 
groups, but more so for those in lower income groups, who appear to be 
catching up with those in higher income groups.  
The greatest changes have been in the funding of higher education. 
Firstly, there has been a substantial cut in the level of student support. 
This affected all students – poorer students, for example, lost their right 
to maintenance payments, which have been replaced by a less generous 
system of loans6. However, means-tested tuition fees favoured poorer 
students. Overall, student support is more pro-poor than it was in 
1996/7, but the amounts involved are smaller. Grants to higher 
                                                
6  The public subsidy element of student loans is assumed to be 50% of the value 
of loans made in any given year, based on estimates in Barr (2002). 
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education institutions have become the dominant source of funding and 
these are not means-tested. Other things being equal, this would have 
created a stronger pro-rich bias in the funding of higher education. 
However, at the same time, there appears to have been a reduction in 
the proportion of students coming from the top income group and a 
corresponding increase from other income groups, perhaps reflecting 
efforts to widen access to higher education to young people from lower 
socio-economic groups. The net effect is that higher education has 
become less pro-rich over this period, though most income groups have 
experienced little increase, or even a fall, in the value of benefits in kind 
(in real terms). 
The combined effect of these changes in analysed in Table 10. In 
both 1996/7 and 2000/01, lower income groups received a 
disproportionate share of the benefits in kind from education. But, in 
1996/7, they received marginally less than would be expected on the 
basis of their demographic composition, whilst the top income group 
received more (see final column). By 2000/1 this situation had been 
reversed – the “income effect” is now positive for the two bottom 
quintiles and negative for the top income group. This suggests there has 
been a small pro-poor shift in the overall distribution over this period.    
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Table 10: Changing Distribution of Education Benefits in Kind, 
1996/7-2000/01 
 Actual share 
received 
(1) 
Share received if distribution were 
based solely on age and gender 
(2) 
Income effect 
(1) – (2) 
  
2000/01    
Bottom 24.8% 24.1% +0.7% 
2 21.9% 21.4% +0.6% 
3 20.2% 20.6% -0.4% 
4 18.7% 18.5% +0.2% 
Top 
 
14.4% 15.4% -1.0% 
1996/97    
Bottom 24.5% 24.6% -0.1% 
2 20.1% 20.2% -0.2% 
3 21.5% 20.9% +0.6% 
4 17.9% 18.7% -0.9% 
Top 
 
16.1% 15.6% +0.5% 
Change: 1996/97-2000/01 
Bottom +0.3% -0.5% +0.8% 
2 +1.8% +1.2% +0.6% 
3 -1.3% -0.3% -1.0% 
4 +0.8% -0.2% +1.0% 
Top -1.7% -0.2% -1.5% 
 
c) Housing  
 
UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRIBUTION 
Table 11 shows our estimates of the benefits in kind from housing. In 
2000/01, these are worth around £1,000 for each social sector tenant or 
more than £2,000 per household in the social rented sector. 
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Table 11: Distribution of Housing Benefits in Kind, 1996/7-2000/01 
(£ per person, 2000/01 prices, rounded to nearest £10) 
 1996/7 2000/01 Change: 
(1996/7-2000/1) 
All housing     
Bottom 400 420 +20 
2 490 420 -70 
3 270 280 +10 
4 190 200 +10 
Top 80 70 -10 
Average 
 
290 280 -10 
Social housing    
Bottom 350 360 +10 
2 410 340 -70 
3 180 180 0 
4 100 90 -10 
Top 30 40 +10 
Average 
 
210 200 -10 
Right to Buy    
Bottom 50 60 +10 
2 80 70 -10 
3 80 110 +30 
4 90 110 +20 
Top 60 40 -20 
Average 70 80 +10 
 
Estimates of housing benefits in kind are very sensitive to the 
methodology used for imputing ‘economic rents’ (i.e. the unsubsidised 
value of social sector tenancies). Using the private rented sector as the 
benchmark produces much higher values than our previous method, 
which assumed a 4% return on estimated property values (Sefton, 1997). 
In 1993/4, the average value of housing benefits in kind was around £150 
per person using the previous methodology, compared to £360 per 
person using the new methodology (both in 2000/1 prices). This is 
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because the implicit rate of return to private landlords is substantially 
greater than 4%. The differential has narrowed over time as private 
sector rents have risen more slowly in real terms than property values 
up to 2000/01. The shape of the distribution, however, is very similar 
whichever method is used7.  
Housing is the most pro-poor of all the major services, reflecting 
the concentration of social sector tenants at the bottom of the income 
distribution – over 40% of people in the bottom quintile group are social 
sector tenants, compared to less than 3% of those in the top quintile (see 
Table 12). 
  
Table 12: Use of Housing Services by Income Group, 1996/7 and 
2000/01 
Income group (quintile groups of individuals) % of individuals ‘using’ each 
service and whether significantly 
different to bottom quintile group. 
Bottom 2 3 4 Top 
Social sector housing1  
- 1996/7 
- 2000/1 
 
 
42% 
42% 
 
39%**
35%** 
 
17%** 
17%** 
 
8%** 
8%** 
 
2%** 
3%** 
Right To Buy scheme1,2  
- 1996/7 
- 2000/1 
 
6% 
6% 
 
9%** 
10%** 
 
10%** 
15%** 
 
10%** 
12%** 
 
5%** 
4%** 
 
Notes: 
**  significantly different to bottom quintile at 1% level, * significantly different at 10% 
level  
1. Based on Family Resources Survey 
2. Owner-occupiers who purchased their current home from the local authority. These 
figures are adjusted upwards to allow for those Right To Buy participants who 
cannot be identified in the Family Resources Survey because they have since moved 
home (see Annex A for details). 
 
                                                
7  This reflects the close correlation between imputed market rents and property 
values, which are the basis for estimating economic rents in each approach, 
respectively. 
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There are two other major determinants of the value of benefits in 
kind from social housing. Firstly, rent differentials are much narrower in 
the social rented sector than in the private rented sector and, therefore, 
subsidies are much greater, on average, for more valuable properties in 
London and the rest of the South East. Secondly, the average subsidy per 
person is greater for people living alone or in small households, because 
there are economies of scale in accommodating larger households. (The 
rent on a typical four-bedroom home, for example, will, on average, be 
less than double the rent on a typical two-bedroom home.)  
Both factors tend to reduce the pro-poor bias, because social sector 
tenants living in smaller households and/or in the South East are more 
likely to be in higher income groups. Thus, on average, better-off social 
sector tenants receive a higher subsidy per capita than those from lower 
income groups. Despite this, the distribution of benefits from social 
housing is still strongly pro-poor.  
By contrast, the Right To Buy (RTB) scheme appears to be of most 
benefit to households in the middle of the income distribution, because 
better-off tenants are more likely to have exercised their Right To Buy 
(see Table 12). They would be in a better position to obtain a mortgage 
and would perhaps have had greater aspirations to own their own home 
- and this scheme gives them a quicker and cheaper route into owner-
occupation. There is also evidence that the stock of past RTB 
participants, who are included in our estimates (and who outnumber 
recent purchasers) have been moving up the income distribution over 
time (see below), suggesting that RTB households are also more 
‘upwardly-mobile’ than other households in the social rented sector. 
Households that exercise their Right To Buy are typically larger 
than other social sector households, so the average subsidy per head is 
slightly lower (see above). Unlike social housing, subsidies per head do 
not vary much between income groups, because participants in the RTB 
scheme are a more homogeneous group – predominantly larger families, 
living in semi-detached or terraced houses.  
The impact of including the RTB scheme is to dampen the pro-
poor bias in the overall distribution of housing benefits in kind, though 
it remains strongly pro-poor. 
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EXPLAINING CHANGES 
Our estimates of housing benefits in kind have fallen since 1996/7, 
because private sector rents fell slightly in real terms8, whilst social 
sector rents rose in real terms.  
Between 1979-1993/4, there was a marked shift in favour of lower 
income groups as the size of the social rented sector fell over time and 
what remained has been allocated increasingly to those in lower income 
groups – part of the ‘residualisation’ of council housing. This trend 
appears to have petered out in recent years. There has been some 
redistribution between income groups since 1996/7, but the pattern is 
more uneven and less straightforward to explain (see Table 13).  
The bottom quintile experienced a small increase in its share, 
because the average size of households in this income group has fallen, 
which means that the average subsidy per person has risen. The third 
and fourth quintiles have also gained slightly, because of changes in the 
distribution of benefits from the Right To Buy scheme. Past RTB 
participants tend to be older and have higher incomes than recent 
participants. As the stock of previous participants increases, so the 
distribution appears to have shifted in favour of middle/upper income 
groups. The second quintile, on the other hand, experienced a significant 
fall in its share of housing benefits in kind, because it has a lower 
proportion of social sector tenants than before (35% in 2000/01, 
compared to 39% in 1996/7). The top quintile receives a small share of 
benefits in kind in both years. 
 
                                                
8  According to official data (based on the Private Renter’s Survey and 
published by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister), the average rent on 
assured shorthold tenancies in the private rented sector were £94 per week in 
1996/7 and £103 per week in 2000/1 – a 1% fall in real terms (using the GDP 
deflator). In our FRS sample, the fall in average rents was 2.5% in real terms.  
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Table 13: Changing Distribution of Housing Benefits in Kind, 1996/7-
2000/01 
 Actual share 
received 
(1) 
Share received if distribution were 
based solely on age and gender 
(2) 
Income effect 
(1) – (2) 
  
2000/01    
Bottom 30.1% 20.8% +9.3% 
2 30.0% 21.2% +8.8% 
3 20.4% 20.1% +0.3% 
4 14.3% 19.3% -5.0% 
Top 
 
5.2% 18.8% -13.6% 
1996/97    
Bottom 28.0% 20.5% +7.5% 
2 34.2% 21.5% +12.7% 
3 18.7% 20.0% -1.3% 
4 13.3% 19.2% -5.9% 
Top 
 
5.8% 18.8% -13.0% 
Change: 1996/97-2000/01 
Bottom +2.1% +0.3% +1.8% 
2 -4.2% -0.3% -3.9% 
3 +1.7% +0.1% +1.6% 
4 +1.0% +0.1% +0.9% 
Top -0.6% 0.0% -0.6% 
 
d) Personal Social Services 
Personal Social Services (PSS) are the smallest component of the social 
wage, but a very important addition for very elderly who make the 
greatest use of these services. In 1996/7, the UK spent around £250 per 
person on residential and non-residential social services (in 2000/01 
prices). We allocate around 40% of this, excluding all residential care for 
children and working age adults. We do not have adequate survey data 
for 2000/01, so we are unable to examine changes over time. The analysis 
below is for 1996/7, based on data from the Disability Follow-Up to the 
1996/7 Family Resources Survey. 
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UNDERSTANDING THE DISTRIBUTION 
Table 14 shows the distribution of benefits in kind for personal social 
services for older people and for younger adults with a mental illness or 
learning disability (non-residential care only). These services include 
home help, day centres, meals-on-wheels, nursing homes, and 
residential homes for the elderly. 
 
Table 14: Distribution of Benefits in Kind from Personal Social 
Services, 1996/7 (in 2000/01 prices1) 
 All individuals 
(£s per person1) 
Aged 75 or over 
(£s per person2) 
Younger adults 
(£s per person1) 
Non-residential care    
Bottom 30 180 15 
2 75 290 45 
3 75 490 45 
4 45 440 30 
Top 15 240 15 
Average 
 
50 300 30 
Residential care    
Bottom 60 540 - 
2 105 850 - 
3 50 670 - 
4 20 510 - 
Top 5 250 - 
Average 50 650 - 
 
Notes: 
1. Rounded to nearest £5 
2. Rounded to nearest £10. 
 
The distribution of benefits in kind from personal social services is 
neither pro-poor, nor pro-rich. Individuals in the bottom income group 
benefit more than those in the top income groups, but those in the 
middle of the income distribution benefit most. In part, this reflects the 
spread of older and disabled people within the income distribution.  
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However, even when differences in the age and disability of 
people in different income groups are taken into account, there remains 
a positive bias in favour of middle income groups and a negative bias 
against potential service users in the bottom income group. This is 
perhaps surprising given that these services are delivered on the basis of 
need and, in the case of residential care, are subject to a means-test.  
In the case of non-residential care, the distribution is hump-
shaped. Individuals in the bottom quintile group make less use of home 
care and day care services than middle income groups. Focusing only on 
people with a more severe disability, those in the bottom income group 
use fewer services than all other income groups, including the top 
quintile – and these differences are statistically significant (see Table 15).   
 
Table 15: Use of Personal Social Services by Income Group, 1996/7 
Income group (quintile groups of individuals) % of individuals using each service 
and whether significantly different 
to bottom quintile group 
Bottom 2 3 4 Top 
Home care services1  
- All persons 
- Low disability2 
- Medium/ severe disability3 
 
 
0.8% 
3% 
6% 
 
1.5%** 
  5%** 
  9%* 
 
1.4%** 
4% 
 14%** 
 
0.9% 
 2% 
15%** 
 
 0.3%**
    2% 
  10%* 
Day care services1  
- All persons 
- Low disability2 
- Medium/severe disability3 
 
0.6% 
 3%  
5%  
 
1.5%** 
 6%** 
    9%** 
 
1.2%** 
  5%** 
   10%** 
 
0.5%** 
2% 
   7%* 
 
0.4%** 
 4% 
    8%* 
 
Notes: 
1. Based on Disability Follow-Up to the 1996/7 Family Resources Survey. 
2. OPCS categories 1-3. 
3. OPCS categories 4 or higher. 
 
Users in lower income groups are often charged less for these 
services, but charges may have a greater disincentive effect on their use, 
because their incomes are relatively low - although survey data suggests 
that affordability is not the issue. Other possible explanations are that 
potential users in lower income groups are more reliant on informal 
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support from relatives and friends, or that they are less able or willing to 
access services. 
Support for those in residential care is entirely means-tested, and 
so is more favourable to lower income groups than non-residential care. 
However, the distribution is not as pro-poor as one might perhaps 
expect, because of the way the means-test operates. Firstly, housing 
equity is included within the means-test (for those who do not have 
partners or dependents living at home). Older people in the bottom 
income group are more likely to own their own home than older people 
in the middle of the income distribution and so would be less likely to 
qualify for support towards the costs of residential care, even though 
their incomes are lower. Secondly, the means-test is based on an 
individual’s income, as opposed to household income, which means that 
more people in higher income groups qualify than would otherwise be 
the case. (This has less impact on those at the bottom of the income 
distribution, because many of them would still qualify for support even 
if their partner’s income were included.) Those in the second quintile 
group do best, because they have relatively low incomes and relatively 
small amounts of capital, including housing equity. 
Table 16 shows the combined share of benefits in kind from 
residential and non-residential care. Those in the bottom quintile group 
receive less than an equal share (i.e. 20%), but would be expected to 
receive substantially more than an equal share on the basis of their 
demographic composition – hence, the large and negative “income 
effect” implied in the discussion above.  
 
Table 16: Distribution of Personal Social Services Benefits in Kind, 
1996/7 
 Actual share 
received 
(1) 
Share received if distribution were 
based solely on age and gender 
(2) 
Income effect 
(1) – (2) 
Bottom 18.6% 25.3% -6.7% 
2 37.2% 29.2% +8.0% 
3 25.7% 19.6% +6.1% 
4 13.6% 14.5% -0.9% 
Top 4.8% 11.4% -6.6% 
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V. Summary 
In 2000/01, benefits in kind from publicly funded welfare services were 
worth an average of £1,700 per person or nearly £4,000 per household 
(or more if personal social services were included). This represents a 
very substantial addition to people’s incomes, especially for those in 
lower income groups. On average, individuals in the bottom two fifths 
of the income distribution receive around twice as much as those in the 
top fifth, 50% more than those in the fourth quintile, and 25% more than 
those in the middle quintile.   
Overall, around half this pro-poor bias is explained by 
demographic factors; lower income groups contain more children and 
older people, who are the most intensive users of education and health 
care services. However, a clear pro-poor bias remains even if differences 
in the demographic composition of income groups are controlled for. 
This shows the importance of taking into account variations in people’s 
use of welfare services that are related to their incomes and other socio-
economic characteristics, which are not reflected in official estimates of 
benefits in kind produced by the Office of National Statistics (ONS).  
There are other important differences between our methodology 
for estimating benefits in kind and that used by the ONS. In the case of 
housing, this produces much larger estimates, which we believe more 
accurately reflect the economic value to tenants of living in social 
housing. In the case of higher education, it generates a pro-rich, rather 
than a pro-poor, distribution, because we allocate the benefits to parents 
instead of students. This seems to be more consistent with the principles 
that underlie the funding of higher education. 
Although the overall distribution of the social wage is pro-poor, 
the extent of this pro-poor bias varies markedly between services (see 
Table 17). Social housing is strongly pro-poor and health care, schools, 
and further education are moderately pro-poor. Personal social services 
and the Right To Buy scheme are pro-poor according to the summary 
indicator used in Table 13, which focuses on the two extremes of the 
income distribution; but the distribution is in fact hump-shaped, 
favouring those in the middle of the income distribution. Higher 
education is pro-rich if the benefits are allocated to their parents, 
although this result is very sensitive to assumptions about the impact of 
supporting dependent students on their parents’ standard of living. 
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Controlling for demographic differences reduces the pro-poor bias for 
the reasons already discussed. For education services, in particular, most 
of the variation between income groups can be accounted for by 
demographic factors.  
The overall pro-poor bias is substantially greater than the figures 
reported in our earlier work (Sefton, 1997) – the ratio of benefits in kind 
received by the bottom and top quintile groups was 1.7 (or 1.2 after 
adjusting for demographic effects). One reason is that there has been an 
increase in the pro-poor bias since 1993 (see below). But, this increase is 
also partly explained by changes in the methodology for estimating the 
value of the social wage. Firstly, the new approach to imputing housing 
benefits in kind produces much larger estimates than the old approach; 
since housing is more pro-poor than other services, this increases the 
overall pro-poor bias. Secondly, recent surveys have better data, which 
allows us to capture more fully variations in the use of services between 
income groups – for example, information on the use of private health 
care. This produces more accurate estimates of benefits in kind, which 
are generally more pro-poor.  
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Table 17: Distribution of Benefits in Kind by Service, 2000/01 
 Ratio of benefits in kind received by individuals in 
the bottom quintile group relative to top quintile 
group. 
 Adjusted Demographically-adjusted1 
Health care 1.8 1.5 
In-patients 2.2 1.6 
Out-patients 1.4 1.2 
GP consultations 1.5 1.4 
Prescriptions 2.0 1.5 
Dental services 
 
1.0 0.9 
Education 1.7 1.0-1.1 
Schools (under 16) 2.6 1.2 
Schools (over 16) and FE 1.6 0.8 
Higher education 
 
0.6 0.8-1.0 
Housing 5.9 5.3 
Social rented housing 9.7 8.1 
Right To Buy 
 
1.5 1.6 
Personal Social Services 3.9 1.7 
Non-residential care 1.7 1.3 
Residential care 
 
10.1 2.4 
ALL SERVICES 2.1 1.5 
 
Note: 
1. This is calculated by dividing the share of benefits in kind received by each income 
group by the amount they would receive if individuals in each income group were 
allocated the average for their age/gender group or, in the case of higher education, if 
spending were distributed evenly between all university-age children (for the lower 
figure) or all university-age children living at home (for the higher figure).  
 
Analysis of individual services highlights a number of factors that 
contribute to a pro-poor bias in the distribution of benefits in kind. These 
are, broadly in order of importance: 
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? Differences in the age composition of income groups, except in the 
case of higher education; 
? Other factors affecting need, such as long-standing illness in the 
case of health and social care services and special needs in the case 
of schools; 
? Targeting of services, such as social housing; 
? Differential use of private alternatives, including private schools 
and health care; 
? Means-tested support, for example for residential care, and 
charges for prescriptions, dental care and other services. 
 
There are also some offsetting factors that lead to a more pro-rich 
(or less pro-poor) distribution than would otherwise be the case. For 
example: 
? Participation rates in post-compulsory schooling and higher 
education are lower for young people from poorer households, 
although there is some evidence that the gap has been closing; 
? Better-off social sector tenants have been more able to take 
advantage of the Right To Buy scheme; 
? Including housing equity in the means-test for residential care 
support hits the bottom income group particularly hard, because 
they contain a high proportion of poor owner-occupiers; 
? In the case of social care and to a lesser extent health care, there 
seems to be an unexplained bias against potential users in the 
bottom quintile group, who report using fewer services in relation 
to needs than individuals in higher income groups. 
 
The value of the social wage has increased substantially in real 
terms – by nearly 50% between 1979 and 2000/01. Furthermore, the share 
of benefits in kind received by the bottom two quintiles has increased 
incrementally throughout this period. This cannot be accounted for by 
demographic factors, which have favoured higher income groups. This 
trend continued between 1996/7 and 2000/01, broadly the period of this 
Labour Government’s first term in office. Over this period, the share of 
the social wage received by the bottom income group has risen by 0.8 
percentage points, whilst that received by the top income group has 
fallen by around the same amount.  
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Changes in the distribution over time are harder to explain than 
the overall distribution at any given point in time. The amounts 
involved are relatively small for individual services or specific sub-
periods, although the cumulative impact is significant over the longer-
term and across all services. Nor is there a single or consistent 
explanation for the increase in the pro-poor bias. Some of these changes 
reflect a conscious attempt to redistribute the benefits in favour of lower 
income groups - for example encouraging higher participation rates in 
further and higher education for young people from lower socio-
economic groups. Some changes are largely a by-product of other 
government policies - for example the ‘residualisation’ of social housing, 
which has led to a concentration of social sector tenants at the bottom 
end of the income distribution.  Other changes reflect changes in the 
pattern of needs - for example an increase in the proportion of 
individuals in lower income groups who report a long-standing and 
limiting illness relative to higher income groups.  
Changes in the social wage between 1996/7-2000/01 are 
progressive: as a percentage of their incomes, households in lower 
income groups benefited more than households in higher income groups 
– by 4-5%, on average, for the poorest 40% of households, compared 
with less than 1% for the top three quintiles. Compared with the impact 
of tax and benefit policies – the other major instrument for redistribution 
- changes in the social wage are around half the size and slightly less 
progressive, but help to reinforce the re-distributional effects of fiscal 
reforms over this period.  
The overall impact of the social wage on inequality is about the 
same in 2000/01 as it was in 1996/7. Although the social wage is now 
more pro-poor, it is also a smaller share of household incomes, because 
households’ cash incomes have grown at a faster rate than the value of 
their social wage over this period – 12% in real terms as against 8%. 
These two effects cancelled each other out. Thus, changes in the social 
wage have not prevented inequality in final incomes, which include the 
social wage, from rising as much as inequality in cash incomes.  
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Annex A: Details of Methodology for Allocating Benefits in 
Kind 
A1. Health care 
Annex C provides a breakdown of public expenditure on health care. 
Spending on individual health care services is allocated in proportion to 
peoples’ use of these services, using micro-data from the Family 
Resources Survey, the General Household Survey, and the British 
Household Panel Survey for the relevant years (see Annex B for more 
details).  
Expenditure is not allocated if there is no survey data on the use of 
these services or if spending cannot easily be attributed to individual 
patients (e.g. central and miscellaneous services). The one exception is 
“other hospital services” which is allocated in proportion to imputed 
spending on all other hospital services. In total, we allocate around 85% 
of total health care expenditure. 
Where data is not available from the Family Resources survey - the 
base data set for all our analysis - then information has to be ‘imported’ 
from one of the other household surveys. Logit regressions are used to 
estimate the probability that someone will have used a particular 
service, for example an inpatient stay in an NHS hospital, based on their 
own and their household’s characteristics, using a set variables also 
available in the FRS. Variables included in these equations include 
health status (whether has a long-standing and/or limiting illness, 
whether in receipt of invalidity benefit), employment status, household 
type, region, tenure, and household income (dummies for each quintile 
group). Separate regressions are run for 8 different age and gender 
groups (aged 0-15, 16-44, 45-64, and 65+) to allow for differences in the 
significance of variables between these groups, following Propper and 
Upward (1993). These equations are used to impute the probability that 
someone will have used a particular service at least once for all 
individuals within the FRS.  
To allow for the fact that some people will have used these 
services more intensively than others, these probabilities are weighted, 
using information in the GHS on the average number of times each 
service is used for broad categories of age and health status.  
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A further adjustment is made for differences in the average cost of 
treating patients. Older patients, for example, are generally more 
expensive to treat than younger patients. Firstly, we estimate total 
expenditure by age group, when spending is allocated directly in 
proportion to people’s use of hospital and community health services 
(i.e. assuming unit costs are the same for all patients). Secondly, we 
compare these with figures published by the Department of Health in 
their Annual Report and adjust our estimates upwards or downwards, 
so that in aggregate they match the DH figures.    
Having allocated gross expenditure, charges are deducted for 
prescriptions and dental services. Patients who are exempt from charges 
(i.e. children, older people, and new mothers) are identified and total 
revenue from charges is then allocated to all other patients in proportion 
to their use of these services. 
 
A2.  Education 
Annex C provides a breakdown of public expenditure on education. 
Around 80% of this is allocated, excluding support services, 
miscellaneous services, and estimated spending on part-time students in 
further and higher education (see below).  
Spending on state-run nursery/primary, secondary, and special 
schools is distributed evenly between pupils in each type of school. 
Expenditure on “under fives” is combined with spending on primary 
schools, because the Family Resources Survey does not distinguish the 
two. No attempt is made to allow for local variations in spending per 
pupil.  
Only full-time students in tertiary education are clearly 
identifiable within the Family Resources Survey, because the 2000/01 
survey does not distinguish between part-time students and people 
attending evening classes and other ‘leisure-oriented’ classes. We 
estimate the amount spent on full-time students in further education 
and allocate this to students in the same way as spending on schools (see 
above).   
For the reasons discussed in the main paper, spending on higher 
education is not allocated to students even if they are living away from 
home, but to their parents (except for mature students). This, we believe, 
is more consistent with the principles that underlie the funding of higher 
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education. Support towards tuition fees, for example, is based on 
parental incomes, not students’ own incomes.  
The FRS is able to identify three categories of students: mature 
students (aged 25 or over), younger students living with their parents, 
and younger students studying away from home. Not all students in the 
last of these categories will be included directly in household surveys – 
those living in halls of residence will be omitted, like all people living in 
institutional settings. However, they can be identified indirectly, because 
older respondents to the Family Resources Survey are asked whether 
they have children aged 16-24 who are studying away from home and, if 
so, how many. (This will include some part-time students and some who 
are not in higher education, but it is the best information we have 
available.)   
Again, we estimate the share of government grants to higher 
education establishments that is for full-time students and distribute this 
evenly between mature students and parents of younger students. We 
do not allocate any of this expenditure to younger students who are in 
the survey, but who are not living with their parents. In effect, the 
benefits to these students are allocated instead to their parents (or, more 
accurately, a representative sample of parents with children in higher 
education).  
Survey data on household incomes is used to simulate the amount 
of student support received by mature students and the parents of 
dependent students. For 1996/7, we attempt to simulate the system that 
prevailed before 1998/9 – course fees for most full-time students, means-
tested maintenance grants, and student loans. For 2000/01, we simulate 
the new system introduced in 1998/9 – means-tested tuition fees, and 
larger student loans (which are also partly means-tested). Although 
student loans are different in nature to other types of expenditure, there 
is a substantial subsidy implicit in the arrangements for repaying loans – 
zero real interest rates, delayed repayment, and deferment option for 
those on low incomes. We assume that this subsidy is equivalent to 50% 
of the value of the loans taken out in any given year, following Barr 
(2002).   
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A3.  Housing 
Housing is treated differently to other services, because current 
expenditure is a poor guide to the value of social housing. The biggest 
item of expenditure is the Housing Revenue Account subsidy to local 
authorities to cover the difference between their expected rental income 
and interest charges on past borrowing. This depends to a great extent 
on the maturity of the housing stock, which is largely irrelevant to any 
proper valuation of the benefits to social sector tenants. The other major 
item is expenditure by the Housing Corporation on the construction of 
new social housing. But, what we would like to measure is not this 
initial capital investment, but the flow of benefits to tenants in 
subsequent years. Lastly, the Right To Buy scheme involves substantial 
subsidies to buyers in the form of large discounts on the purchase price, 
but no direct public expenditure. Therefore, a different approach is 
needed for housing.   
What we attempt to measure instead is the difference between the 
rents paid by social sector tenants and the ‘economic rent’ that would 
need to be charged if local authorities were to cover their costs in full. 
Economic rents are estimated using information on the rents paid for 
similar properties in the private rented sector. So, what we are 
effectively measuring is the additional amount that social sector tenants 
would need to pay if they had to rent their property privately at ‘market 
rents’, rather than at the subsidised rents charged by local authorities 
and housing associations.  
In our previous report (Sefton, 1997), economic rents were based 
on estimated property values, using information on purchase prices in 
the owner-occupied sector.   The advantage of using the private rented 
sector to estimate economic rents is that rents are less cyclical than house 
prices, so our estimates of benefits in kind will be more stable over time. 
Furthermore, there is no need to make allowances for maintenance and 
management costs, since landlords should take these costs into account 
in setting private sector rents.  
Using a sample of around 1,000 private rented sector properties in 
the 2000/01 FRS (and around 800 properties in the 1996/7 FRS), we 
estimate a regression for rents, based on the characteristics (e.g. property 
type, number of bedrooms) and location of the property. Separate 
regressions are estimated for properties in different council tax bands. 
Only assured short-hold tenancies are included in this analysis, because 
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rents on other types of tenancies are likely to be distorted. These 
regression equations are then used to estimate the economic rent for 
similar properties in the social rented sector.  
Whilst these equations are good at explaining the variation in rents 
in the private rented market, they will not capture all those factors that 
influence market rents, in particular local or neighbourhood effects – 
only regional dummies are included in our regression analysis. This 
would not matter if there were no systematic differences between the 
sorts of neighbourhoods where private rented properties are located and 
the sort of neighbourhoods where social rented sector properties are 
located. But, if, as we might expect, social rented properties are in less 
desirable locations then we may be over-estimating the economic rent on 
social sector properties. We do, however, estimate separate regressions 
for properties in each council tax band, so this is only a problem in so far 
as we may be over-estimating economic rents within each tax band (i.e. 
we are not using information on 2-bedroom flats in Chelsea to estimate 
the economic rent on 2 bedroom council properties in Bermondsey).  
One way of testing whether we may be systematically over-
estimating the worth of council housing is by comparing the value of ex-
council properties purchased under the Right To Buy scheme with the 
value of other private sector housing, whilst controlling for all the other 
characteristics included in our regressions. This is not an ideal 
comparison, because RTB properties are not representative of all council 
housing and owner-occupied homes are not representative of private 
rented properties, but it does at least provide a weak test of our 
hypothesis. If we include a dummy variable for RTB properties in 
regressions of property values against dwelling characteristics (with 
separate regressions for each council tax band), the coefficient is 
relatively small, quite often positive, and in all but one case insignificant 
(at the 10% level). In other words, within each tax band, RTB properties 
do not appear to be worth significantly less or more, on average, than 
other similar properties in the owner-occupied sector. Thus, on this basis 
at least, there is no evidence that we are significantly over-estimating (or 
under-estimating) the worth of council housing.  
Having estimated the economic rent on social sector properties, we 
simply deduct the gross rent charged by the local authority or housing 
association in order to obtain our estimates of benefits in kind. We do 
not deduct the actual rent paid, but the amount tenants would pay if 
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they were not receiving any housing benefit. (Housing benefit is already 
included in people’s cash incomes and so we do not wish to include it 
again in our measure of benefits in kind.)  
Former Right To Buy participants are also allocated a benefit in 
kind to reflect the subsidy they receive in the form of large discounts on 
the purchase price of their home. This ensures that comparisons over 
time are not distorted by the shift from one form of subsidy (i.e. 
subsidised rents) to another (i.e. subsidised owner-occupation). 
Households who have exercised their Right to Buy are identified in the 
FRS, providing they are still living in the same property (see Annex B). 
Figures on total Right To Buy sales by region (up to and including the 
year of analysis) are used to gross up our figures to allow for those 
participants who benefited from the scheme, but have since moved on. 
The implicit assumption is that those participants who have stayed put 
are representative of those who have moved on (in terms of their 
position in the income distribution). 
The value of the discount received by RTB households could be 
treated as a once-off lump sum benefit and allocated in full to 
households who exercised their Right To Buy in that year. An alternative 
approach adopted in this analysis is to calculate benefits in kind for RTB 
participants in a similar way to those for social sector tenants, which 
spreads the benefits over time. In the case of RTB participants, we have 
to estimate both the economic rent and the social sector rent they would 
be paying if they had remained as social sector tenants (again using 
regression analysis). Our estimate of benefits in kind is the difference 
between the imputed private sector rent and the imputed social sector 
rent on their property. The rationale for this rather convoluted approach 
is that these households would not have exercised their Right To Buy if 
they were not going to be at least as well off as they would have been as 
social sector tenants. The advantage of doing it this way is that the 
results are comparable with our estimates of benefits in kind for social 
sector tenants.    
So far, our estimates of housing benefits in kind are for the whole 
household. To put these on a par with estimates of benefits in kind for 
other welfare services, we divide them by the number of people in the 
household. 
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A4.  Personal Social Services 
Some non-residential care services, such as home help, are only used by 
a very small proportion of the population. Therefore, large samples are 
needed to be able to explore variations in the use of services by income 
group. The only reliable source of data that we have available is the 
Disability Follow-Up Survey to the 1996/7 Family Resources Survey. 
This asks detailed questions on the use of various social and health 
services by all older and disabled respondents in the main FRS survey 
for that year. However, a similar follow-up survey was not carried out in 
2000/01 (or any of the intervening years), so we are only able to  produce 
estimates of benefits in kind for 1996/7. 
As for health care services, expenditure on home care, day care, 
and meals on wheels, is allocated in proportion to people’s use of these 
services, using information on how often people use these services. 
Charges are then deducted in proportion to usage, excluding those who 
are in receipt of income support (who would normally be exempt from 
paying charges). In practice, local authorities operate a range of different 
charging policies, which we are not able to replicate, but this is unlikely 
to have a material impact on our estimates of benefits in kind.  
Benefits in kind from residential care for the elderly are allocated 
to the household population using an insurance-based approach. The 
rationale, as explained in the main part of the paper, is that the 
government is effectively providing part insurance against the ‘risk’ of 
being admitted into residential care. The value of this insurance policy is 
equal to: 
? the probability that someone will require residential care given 
their age, gender, and marital status; multiplied by  
? the amount of public support they would receive if they were 
admitted into residential care.   
 
The former is based on estimates of the numbers of people in 
residential or nursing homes in 1996, broken down by age, gender, and 
whether the person was living alone before they were admitted 
(Wittenburg, 1998). These are divided by the total population in these 
categories to generate the probability of someone of a given age, gender, 
and household status being in residential care. This does not allow for 
any differences in admission rates by income group, although incomes 
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are taken into account in estimating the amount of public support each 
individual would receive if they were admitted (see below). 
The latter is simulated using information on people’s income, 
savings, and housing equity, using the rules laid out for means-tested 
support from local authorities (for those admitted into permanent care). 
Housing equity is only included if someone owns their own home and is 
the head of household (i.e. does not have a partner or dependents living 
with them). 
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Annex B: Survey Questions Used to Allocate Benefits in Kind 
Health care:   
Inpatient stays Whether been in hospital as an inpatient during 
the last year and, if so, how many stays, and how 
many of these were in an NHS hospital 
(excluding inpatient stays in order to have a 
baby, which are allocated separately to all 
mothers with a baby aged less than one). 
General 
Household 
Survey 
Day-patient visits Whether been in hospital as a day-patient during 
the last year and, if so, how many separate visits 
and how many of these were under the NHS. 
" 
Outpatient visits Whether attended the casualty or outpatient 
department of a hospital during the last 3 
months and, if so, how many times and how 
many were made under the NHS. 
" 
GP consultations 
 
Whether talked to a doctor during the last 2 
weeks, apart from any visit to hospital and, if so, 
how many times and whether consultations were 
made under the NHS, including consultations 
made on behalf of children or other household 
members (which are allocated to the person on 
whose behalf the consultation was made). 
" 
Prescriptions Whether received something on prescription in 
the last 4 weeks and, if so, how many items and 
whether had to pay for them. 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
Dental services Whether visited the dentist for an NHS 
examination or treatment in the last 4 weeks. 
" 
Opthalmic services Whether had a free eyesight test or purchased 
glasses or contact lenses with the help of an NHS 
voucher in the last 4 weeks.  
" 
Community Health 
Services 
Whether made use of health visitor/ district 
nurse and/or chiropodist in the last year and, if 
so, whether this was under the NHS and whether 
had to pay for each service (adults only). 
British 
Household 
Panel Survey 
Education:   
Primary/ nursery 
schools 
Whether attends a state-run nursery/ 
primary/ playschool. 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
Secondary 
schools 
Whether attends a state-run or assisted 
secondary school. 
" 
Special schools Whether attends a state-run special school. " 
 61
Further education Whether attends a non-advanced further 
education/ 6th form/ tertiary/further 
education college. 
" 
Higher education Whether attends a university (for mature 
students and younger students living at 
home).  
Whether have any children aged 16-24 
outside this household who are in full- or 
part-time education (for younger students 
living away from home). 
" 
Housing:   
Social housing Whether rents from the local authority/ New 
Town/ Scottish Homes or a housing 
association, charitable trust or Local Housing 
Company and, if so, the gross weekly rent. 
Survey data on rents for assured short-hold 
tenancies in the private rented sector are 
used to impute economic rents for social 
sector tenants. 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
Right To Buy Whether owner-occupiers previously rented 
the property from the local authority or 
housing association. 
" 
Personal Social Services:  
Home care Whether, in the past 6 months, has received 
one or more of the following services: local 
authority home help, laundry service, night 
sitting service, rehabilitation, or guide/help 
for the deaf/ blind.  
If so, how often.  
Disability 
Follow-Up 
to the 1996/7 
FRS 
Day care Whether regularly goes to a day centre, adult 
training centre, or other centre for training or 
social activities. If so, how often.  
" 
Meals on wheels Whether has received meals on wheels 
service in the past 6 months and, if so, how 
often. 
" 
Residential care/ 
nursing home 
 
Survey data on individuals’ incomes, 
savings, and housing equity used to simulate 
the amount of financial support they would 
receive if admitted to a residential or nursing 
home. 
Family 
Resources 
Survey 
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Annex C: Breakdown of Expenditure by Service 
Table C1: Public Expenditure on Health Care in the UK, 1996/7-
2000/011 
(net current expenditure, £ 
million, 2000/01 prices)2 
1996/7 2000/01 % change: 
(1996/7-2000/01) 
Hospital and community health services:   
In-patients 18229 21581 18% 
Out-patients 5541 6202 12% 
Day-patients 638 685 7% 
Other hospital services 672 1412 110% 
Community health services3 5096 7296 43% 
Other HCHS4 2240 2354 5% 
Total HCHS: 
 
32416 39531 22% 
Family health services:    
GP consultations 3833 4451 16% 
Prescriptions5 5754 7016 22% 
Dental Services5 1239 1361 10% 
Opthalmic services 320 370 16% 
Total FHS: 
 
11146 13198 18% 
Central and miscellaneous 
services4 
 
1309 1346 3% 
All health care services:    
Total expenditure 44871 54073 21% 
Allocated expenditure 38506 45585 18% 
% allocated4 86% 84%  
 
Notes: 
1. Gross expenditure figures are from the Department of Health’s Annual Report (for 
England), Health Statistics Wales, and the Annual Abstract of Statistics (for 
Scotland). The breakdown of spending within the health and community services 
total is based on figures produced for the House of Commons Select Committee. For 
2000/01, the same proportionate split between services is assumed as in 1999/2000. 
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Estimated charges for pharmaceutical and dental services and NHS trust receipts (for 
private operations) are deducted, using information from the Department of Health’s 
Annual Report and the Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
2. Figures for 1996/7 are converted into 2000/1 prices using the GDP deflator in market 
prices from the Office of National Statistics’ Blue Book 2002. 
3. Only spending on certain community health services is allocated, including district 
nursing, health visiting, chiropody, and community maternity services. 
4. Spending on these services is not allocated, because survey data is not available on 
the use of these services or because they are not easily attributable to individuals.  
5. Net of revenue from charges for prescriptions and dental services. 
 
Table C2: Public Expenditure on Education in the UK, 1996/7-2000/011 
(net current expenditure, £ 
million, 2000/01 prices) 2 
1996/7 2000/01 % change: 
(1996/7-2000/01 
Schools  
Under fives 1602 2190 37% 
Primary  8095 9454 17% 
Secondary 9942 11389 15% 
Special 1548 1603 4% 
Support services3 2006 2888 44% 
Capital3 1350 1602 19% 
Total schools: 
 
24543 29126 19% 
Further education4 
 
5466 5668 4% 
Higher education  
Grants to HE institutions4 5172 6022 16% 
Student support 5 2934 1862 -37% 
Total HE: 
 
8106 7884 -3% 
Miscellaneous services3 
 
2217 1497 -32% 
All education services:  
Total expenditure 40566 44175 9% 
Allocated expenditure5 31384 34324 9% 
% allocated 77% 78%  
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Notes: 
1. Total expenditure figures for the UK and a broad breakdown by area of expenditure 
are from H M Treasury’s Public Expenditure Analyses for 2002-3 and earlier years. A 
more detailed breakdown of schools expenditure is based on data from the DfES’s 
“Education and Training Expenditure since 1991-2”, assuming the split for Scotland 
and Wales as for England. More detailed data on student support is from the DfES’s 
“Student Support: Statistics of Student Support for Higher Education in England and 
Wales” and “Student Support: Statistics of Student Loans for Higher Education in the 
United Kingdom.” Data on contributions towards fees and maintenance is for 
England and Wales only, so figures are adjusted upwards, based on numbers of 
higher education students in England and Wales and the UK as a whole.   
2. Figures for 1996/7 are converted into 2000/1 prices using the GDP deflator in market 
prices from the Office of National Statistics’ Blue Book 2002. 
3. Spending on these services is not allocated, because survey data is not available on 
the use of these services or because this expenditure is not easily attributable to 
individuals. This includes expenditure on part-time students in further and higher 
education (see footnote 3).  
4. Only expenditure on full-time students is allocated, because the surveys we are using 
do not identify part-time students on a consistent basis. Estimates of the share of 
total spending on full and part-time students is based on the numbers of (Full-Time 
Equivalent) students in each mode of study, where part-time students are counted as 
0.35 of an FTE.   
5. Covers mandatory awards for fees and maintenance (for students starting their 
studies pre-1998/9), contributions towards tuition fees (post 1998/9), and student 
loans. Imputed expenditure on student loans is equal to 50% of the value of loans in 
any given year. A few (small) items of spending are not allocated, including 
discretionary loans by local authorities. 
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Table C3: Public Expenditure on Personal Social Services in the UK, 
1996/7-2000/011  
(net current expenditure, 
£million, 2000/01 prices)2 
1996/7 2000/01 % change: 
(1996/7-2000/01) 
Older people    
Nursing home  787 980  
Residential care homes 1646 1751  
Income Support for people 
in residential care 
1561 1070  
Other5 40 40  
Total residential care: 4036 3841 -5% 
Day care 185 221  
Home Care 1152 1240  
Meals 60 76  
Other5 359 394  
Total non-residential: 1756 1931 +10% 
Care assessment5 454 477  
Total for older people: 6246 6249 0% 
Younger adults    
Residential care3,5 1624 1806  
Non-residential care 1283 1561  
Care assessment5 343 426  
Total for younger adults: 3251 3793 +17% 
Children5    
Residential care 879 1012  
Non-residential care 1224 1604  
Care assessment 601 733  
Total for children: 2704 3350 +24% 
Other5 899 1347 +50% 
All Personal Social 
Services: 
   
Total expenditure 13100 14739 +13% 
Allocated expenditure5    5389 -  
% allocated5 41% -  
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Notes: 
1. Net expenditure figures for the UK are from HMT’s Public Expenditure Statistical 
Analyses to which are added expenditure on Income Support for people living in 
residential or nursing homes (provided by the Department for Work and Pensions). 
Gross expenditure figures are imputed using data for England (from the Department 
of Health’s Bulletin, “PSS Expenditure and Unit Costs”). The breakdown between 
client groups and between services is based on figures produced for the House of 
Commons Select Committee. 
2. Figures for 1996/7 are converted into 2000/1 prices using the GDP deflator in market 
prices from the Office of National Statistics’ Blue Book 2002. 
3. Includes Income Support expenditure on under-60 year olds living in residential or 
nursing homes (Residential Allowance and support for those with Preserved Rights).  
4. Income Support expenditure is for 1994/5. 
5. Spending on children and residential care for younger adults is not allocated, 
because reliable data is not available on the use of these services. Spending on “care 
assessment” and “other” services is also excluded for the same reason. 
 
